We study the problem of jointly pricing and designing a smart transit system, where a transit agency (the platform) controls a fleet of demand-responsive vehicles (cars) and a fixed line service (buses). The platform offers commuters a menu of …
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have motivated the …
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each of whom …
We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to $n$ buyers with independent private values. In addition, we have an intermediary who knows the buyers' private …
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have motivated the …
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods arrive in a …
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods arrive in a …
We study a game of price competition amongst firms selling homogeneous goods defined by the property that a firm's revenue is independent of any competing prices that are strictly lower. This property is induced by any customer choice model involving …
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have (real-valued) qualities, which are drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better of the two products, but …